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美国历史上的体制性腐败

来源于 《比较》 2019年第5期 出版日期 2019年10月01日
文|约翰·沃利斯

6.体制性腐败的终结

  针对发展中国家的一种思路是,它们的贫穷是因为政府官员的贿赂性腐败相当严重。只有当合适的人和政策到位时,经济增长才会到来。更加悲观和现实的一种观点则认为,发展中国家存在体制性腐败,受困于政府通过体制操控经济,创造经济租金,服务于掌权的党派和人群的政治需要。这不是坏人造成的问题那么简单,而是社会的宪政架构存在根本缺陷。

  美国很自然地带有对体制性腐败的担忧。国家诞生于一场宪政危机,源自行政机构侵犯议会独立性,让全体英国人的基本自由权利受到威胁,从而引发辉格党人的焦虑。现代金融资本主义的新兴制度——国债、中央银行、股票市场以及大量的金融中介——并非腐败的原因。此类制度是体制性腐败的工具,被王室及邪恶的大臣操控。英国的腐败威胁到了基本自由权利,让暴政和奴役来临的警报在1776年四处乱飞。当然,我们今天把18世纪视为个人与经济自由的新时代的黎明,由此产生了现代经济和现代社会。早期的美国人不可能如此自以为是。

  美国建国者在1776年抓住了制定宪法的首次机遇,起草了一系列州宪法来实践制衡政府的原则。他们并没有一蹴而就。在1776—1852年,最初的13个州编写了29部宪法,联邦政府编写了两部。国会于1791年实施了汉密尔顿的金融计划,特意参照了英国的金融体制:国债、中央银行,以及州债务。不到一年之后,针对汉密尔顿和联邦党人设立以他为“首相”的体制、充当影响力和利益网络核心的指控,令国家政坛分崩离析。对于是否应该以及如何推动经济发展,联邦政府在几十年里陷入僵局。联邦政府的中央银行实验随着杰克逊于1832年否决合众国银行的特许执照而终结,此时的议题依旧围绕着体制性腐败。克莱宣称,如果杰克逊不受制衡,那么“我们将会死去,如卑贱、平庸和可怜的奴隶那般不光彩地死去,被嘲笑与轻蔑,没有人同情、悲伤和哀悼!”

  同时在18世纪90年代,各州开始给银行、教堂和所有类型的公司颁发特许执照。到19世纪20年代,各州忙于修建运河,尝试铺设铁路,借钱并把自有资金投入到各种公司。到19世纪30年代,已有600多家州批准的银行,用于国内改造投资的州债务两倍于独立战争和1812年战争时期积累的国债。各州的积极作为并非没有受到质疑。公司依然被看作腐败的潜在工具,纽约的奥尔巴尼摄政团颁发的银行执照是体制性腐败的典型案例:某个政治派系利用创造经济特权来巩固对政治体制的操控。杰克逊的崛起中提出的中心议题是对腐败的抨击,对政府创造特权的批评。虽然大多数美国政府不是彻底的体制性腐败,但包括纽约在内,到处都存在警示迹象。美国人不太认为政府已经很腐败,却担心如果不采取措施维护和强化支持“有制衡的政府”制度,政府将腐败堕落。

  当国内改造繁荣期在1839年崩溃后,各州仔细审查了导致它们发行了2亿美元州债务的各项政策。各州再次把目光转向宪法,并实施了一系列改革,通过一般公司法案确保对公司经营权的自由进入,调整州和地方政府借款的程序,并禁止政府对私人公司投资。除少数特例外,这些宪政改革并未禁止各州促进经济发展的措施,没有限制政府批准设立银行、修建运河与铁路,以及在进步时代建造市政给排水系统和学校教育系统。宪政改革明确把消除体制性腐败的根源作为目标,其方式是削弱政府通过限制进入和授予经济特权创造租金的能力。

  进步派人士在20世纪头10年对贿赂性腐败的担忧,同共和党与联邦党在18世纪90年代、辉格党与民主党在19世纪40年代如出一辙。可是贿赂性腐败并非美国在内战之前面临的最大危险。19世纪早期,暴政和奴役在全世界比比皆是。法国经历了从专制君主制到革命、独裁,再返回君主制的过程。西班牙在新大陆的帝国由于两次革命浪潮而垮塌,当然这两次革命浪潮很大程度上由美国独立革命激发。新大陆的革命政府往往直接借鉴美国的宪政模式,包括分权和制衡。然而拉丁美洲革命结出的果实通常是暴政,而非自由。美国人担心,任何偏离有制衡的政府的运动都将如波利比乌斯断言的那样,导致共和政府衰落,暴政和奴役再起。

  可是到1890年,不仅美国人的有限政府实验被证明是成功的,而且国家制度经历了血腥内战的考验,自由得到捍卫,奴隶制宣告终结。对暴政和奴役的担忧自然开始消退。现代工业经济与全球最大统一市场给美国政府带来了一系列新问题。在19世纪七八十年代尝试经济监管之后,联邦政府在20世纪上半叶快速扩张。授予联邦政府对食品和药品的控制权,在建国者、联邦党人和共和党人看来都是不合情理的。这样的监管开启的租金创造空间,也超出了詹姆斯一世或查尔斯二世的想象。

  不过,进步时代改革家言辞中充斥着对腐败的各种担忧,这种腐败显然是指贿赂性腐败。进步派人士并不害怕政府中的某个派系会以创造经济租金的方式控制政府,他们反对的是经济利益集团利用自己的势力膨胀逼迫政府让步。他们担心美国政府的效率、代表人的品质,以及平等、开放与公正等。他们担忧经济腐蚀政治,而不太关注政治对经济的侵蚀。

  西方民主制度在19世纪和20世纪的里程碑式成就是建立起了稳定的有限政府。没有哪个有着体制性腐败政体的社会存在有限政府,这种经济体制总是面临危险,进入受到限制,竞争受到约束,经济政策被政客操控,以巩固他们对政府的控制。裙带资本主义并非贿赂性腐败的表现,而是体制性腐败的症状。发展中国家没有运转良好的市场,因为非熟人市场必需的开放进入和竞争无法实现,为了制造维持政治体制所需的特权,产业进入受到严格限制。在腐败问题上,美国能提供怎样的经验教训呢?其基本的一条在于:如何构建一个并不依靠对经济操控来实现存续的政府。

  (余江译)

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