6.结束语
我们目前对新制度经济学以及组织经济学的兴趣蕴含了无限变化的可能。自从20世纪70年代起，制度经济学便一直被归于经济学思想的范畴，而且，除了在国家层面(属于比较经济系统)，对比较经济组织的研究都是其他社会科学家的任务，比如社会学家、政治科学家或者组织理论家。1974年举办的“内部组织经济学”会议帮助内部组织在经济学研究议程[*16.来自这次会议的论文在Bell Journal of Economics(1975，1976)上连续见刊数期，作者包括肯尼斯·阿罗、斯特克·布曼(Scott Booman)、列昂尼德·赫维茨(Leonid Herwitz)、哈维·莱宾斯坦(Harvey Leibenstein)、詹姆斯·莫里斯(James Mirrlees)、约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨(Joseph Stiglitz)、奥利弗·威廉姆森(Oliver Williamson)、瓦希特(Wachter)、哈里斯(Harris)以及罗伯特·威尔森(Robert Wilson)。]上取得了一席之地，并一直持续发展至今。对制度经济学研究的兴趣也重新燃起，正如马修斯在就任英国皇家经济学会主席的演讲中指出，新制度经济学已经成为“经济学研究中最活跃的领域之一”(Matthews，1986，第903页)。[*17.另外可参见Menard(1996)。]
交易成本经济学与新制度经济学和组织经济学都相关。正如本文所述，交易成本经济学是一项跨学科研究，涵盖了法律、经济、组织理论等多个领域，而经济学则是其中最为突出的科目；是比较制度分析的实践，以成本节约为主要课题，以交易和治理的细节为行动要点；它产生了大量可证伪的含义，且都已得到广泛的数据证实；它还对公共政策产生了许多影响。交易成本经济学的大部分研究工作都可被正统经济学吸纳，而这正在发生，但新的问题和挑战总会不断出现。可以预期，在未来交易成本经济学与支撑其发展的各个领域(如法律、经济、组织)之间仍将存在这种有益的张力(Kreps，1996；Williamson，1993a，1993b，1996b)。
(陈耿宣 贾钦民 译)
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