参考文献
Alesina， A. and E. Spolare（1997）. “On the Number and Size of Nations，”Quarterly Journal of Economics112，pp.1027-56.
Arrow， K. （1970）. “The Organization of Economic Activity： Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Non-Market Allocation.” In Joint Economic Committee，The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures：The PPB System， Vol. I. Washington， D.C.： U.S. GPO.
Besley， T. and A. Case （1995）. “Incumbent Behavior： Vote-Seeking， Tax-Setting， and Yardstick Competition，”American Economic Review 85，pp.25-45.
Besley， T. and S. Coate （2003）. “Centralized Versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods： A Political Economy Approach，”Journal of Public Economics 87，pp.2611-2637.
Blanchard， O. and A. Shleifer （2000）. “Federalism with and without Political Centralization： China versus Russia，” unpublished paper.
Boadway， R. （1977）. “Public Economics and the Theory of Public Policy，”Canadian Journal of Economics 30，pp.753-772.
Boadway， R. and F. R. Flatters （1982）.Equalization in a Federal State： An Economic Analysis. Ottawa： Economic Council of Canada.
Bolton， P. and G. Roland （1997）. “The Breakup of Nations： A Political Economy Analysis，”Quarterly Journal of Economics112，pp.1057-1090.
Bolton， P.， G. Roland and E. Spolare （1996）. “Economic Theories of the Break-Up and Integration of Nations，”European Economic Review 40，pp.697-705.
Bordignon， M.， F. Cerniglia and F. Revelli （2002）. “In Search for Yardstick Competition： Property Tax Rates and Electoral Behavior in Italian Cities，” Munich： Cesifo Working Paper No. 644（1）.
Bordignon， M.， P. Manasse and G. Tabellini （2001）. “Optimal Regional Redistribution Under Asymmetric Information，”American Economic Review 91，pp.709-723.
Brennan， G. and J. M. Buchanan. （1980）.The Power to Tax： Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution.Cambridge： Cambridge University Press.
Brueckner， J. K. （2004）. “Fiscal Decentralization with Distortionary Taxation： Tiebout vs. Tax Competition，International Tax and Public Finance11，pp.133-153.
Bryce， J. （1893）.The American Commonwealth. London： Macmillan \[first published in 1888\].
Buchanan， J. M. and R. L. Faith （1987）. “Secession and the Limits of Taxation： Toward a Theory of Internal Exit，”American Economic Review77，pp.1023-1031.
Buchanan， J. M. and G. Tullock （1962）.The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor， MI： The University of Michigan Press.
Bucovetsky， S. （1997）. “Insurance and Incentive Effects of Transfers Among Regions： Equity and Efficiency，”International Tax and Public Finance 4，pp.463-483.
Bucovetsky， S.， M. Marchand and P. Pestieau （1998）. “Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure，”Journal of Urban Economics 44，pp.367-390.
Cremer， J.， A. Estache and P. Seabright （1996）. “Decentralizing Public Services： What Can We Learn from the Theory of The Firm?”Revue d’Economie Politique106，pp.37-60.
De Figueiredo， R. and B.Weingast （2002）. “Self-Enforcing Federalism，” unpublished paper. Stanford University：The Hoover Institution.
Dougherty， K. （2001）.Collective Action Under the Articles of Confederation. Cambridge： Cambridge University Press.
Fischel， W. （2001）.The Homevoter Hypothesis. Cambridge， MA： Harvard University Press.
Flatters， F.， V. Henderson and P. Mieszkowski （1974）. “Public Goods， Efficiency， and Regional Fiscal Equalization，”Journal of Public Economics 3，pp.99-112.
Franco， D.， F. Balassone and M. Francese （2003）. “Fiscal Policy in Europe： The Role of Fiscal Rules，”National Tax Association Proceedings， Ninety-Fifth Annual Conference， 2002， Washington D.C.： National Tax Association，pp.7-17.
Frey， B. S.， and R. Eichenberger （1999）.The New Democratic Federalism for Europe： Functional， Overlapping，and Competing Jurisdictions. Cheltenham， U.K.： Edward Elgar.
Garzarelli， G. （2004）. “The Theory of Fiscal Federalism as a Theory of Economic Organization： Assessment and Prospectus，” unpublished paper.
Garzarelli， G. and Y. R. Liman （2003）. “Knowledge， Coordination， and Fiscal Federalism： An Organizational Perspective，”In D. Franco and A. Zanardi. （eds.），I Sistemi diWelfare Tra Decentramento Regionale e Integrazione Europa. Milano： FrancoAngeli， pp. 231-240.
Goodspeed， T. J. （2002）. “Bailouts in a Federation，”International Tax and Public Finance 9，pp.409-421.
Gordon， R. （1983）. “An Optimal Tax Approach to Fiscal Federalism，”Quarterly Journal of Economics 97，pp.567-586.
Hansen， A. and H. Perloff （1944）.State and Local Finance in the National Economy. New York： Norton.
Hicks， U. K. （1978）.Federalism： Failure and Success， A Comparative Study. London： MacMillan.
Inman， R. P. （1988）. “Federal Assistance and Local Services in the United States： The Evolution of a New Federalist Fiscal Order，” In H. Rosen （ed.），Fiscal Federalism： Quantitative Studies. Chicago： University of Chicago Press， pp. 33-74.
Inman， R. P. （2003）. “Transfers and Bailouts： Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline with Lessons from U.S. Federalism，”In J. Rodden et al.（eds.），Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints. Cambridge， MA： MIT Press， pp. 35-83.
Inman， R. P. and D. L. Rubinfeld （1992）. “Fiscal Federalism in Europe： Lessons from the United States Experience，”European Economic Review 36，pp.654-660.
Inman， R. P. and D. L. Rubinfeld （1996）. “Designing Tax Policy in Federalist Economies： An Overview，”Journal of Public Economics 60，pp.307-334.
Inman， R. P. and D. L. Rubinfeld （1997a）. “Rethinking Federalism，”Journal of Economic Perspectives 11，pp.43-64.
Inman， R. P. and D. L. Rubinfeld （1997b）. “Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine： Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism，”Texas Law Review 75，pp.1203-1299.
Janeba， E. and J. D.Wilson （2003）. “Optimal Fiscal Federalism in the Presence of Tax Competition，” unpublished paper.
Kornai， J. （1979）. “Resource-Constrained Versus Demand-Constrained Systems，”Econometrica 47，pp.801-819.
Kornai， J. （1980）.Economics of Shortage. Amsterdam： North Holland.
Kornai， J.， E. Maskin and G. Roland （2003）. “Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint，”Journal of Economic Literature 41，pp.1095-1136.
Levaggi， R. （2002）. “Decentralized Budgeting Procedures for Public Expenditure，”Public Finance Review 30，pp.273-95.
Lockwood， B. （1999）. “Inter-Regional Insurance，”Journal of Public Economics 72，pp.1-37.
Lockwood， B. （2002）. “Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization，”Review of Economic Studies 69，pp.313-337.
McKinnon， Ronald I. （1997）. “Market-Preserving Federalism in the American Monetary Union，” In M. Blejer and T. Ter-Minassian （eds.），Macroeconomic Dimensions of Public Finance： Essays in Honor of Vito Tanzi. London： Routledge， pp. 73-93.
McLure， Jr.， C. E. （1967）. “The Interstate Exporting of State and Local Taxes： Estimates for 1962，”National Tax Journal 20，pp.49-77.
McLure， Jr.， C. E.， （ed.）. （1983）.Tax Assignment in Federal Countries. Canberra： Australian National University.
Musgrave， R. A. （1959）.The Theory of Public Finance. New York： McGraw-Hill.
Musgrave， R. A. （1983）. “Who Should Tax Where and What?” In C. McLure （ed.），Tax Assignment in Federal Countries. Canberra： Australian National University，pp.2-19.
Oates， W. E. （1972）.Fiscal Federalism. New York： Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Oates， W. E. （1985）. “Searching for Leviathan： An Empirical Study，”American Economic Review 75，pp.748-757.
Oates，W. E. （1989）. “Searching for Leviathan： A Reply and Some Further Reflections，”American Economic Review 79，pp.578-583.
Oates， W. E. （1996）. “Taxation in a Federal System： The Tax Assignment Problem，”Public Economics Review1，pp.35-60.
Oates， W. E. （2002）. “Fiscal and Regulatory Competition： Theory and Evidence，”Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 3，pp.377-390.
Oates， W. E.， and R. M. Schwab （1988）. “Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions： Efficiency-Enhancing or Distortion-Inducing?Journal of Public Economics 35，pp.333-354.
Oates，W. E. and R. M. Schwab （1991）. “The Allocative and Distributive Implications of Local Government Competition，” In D. Kenyon and J. Kincaid （eds.），Competition Among States and Local Governments.Washington， D.C.： The Urban Institute， pp. 127-145.
Olson， Jr.， M. （1969）. “The Principle of ‘Fiscal Equivalence’： The Division of Responsibilities among Different Levels of Government，”American Economic Review 59，pp.479-487.
Padovano， F. （2004）. “The Allocative Efficiency and Political Consequences of Centralized vs. Decentralized Income Redistribution Policies，” unpublished paper.
Perrson，T. and G.Tabellini （1996a）. “Federal Fiscal Constitutions： Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard，”Econometrica 64，pp.623-646.
Perrson， T. and G. Tabellini （1996b）. “Federal Fiscal Constitutions： Risk Sharing and Redistribution，”Journal of Political Economy 104，pp.979-1009.
Picciotto， R. and E. Wiesner （1998）.Evaluation and Development： The Institutional Dimension. Washington， D.C.： World Bank.
Prud’homme， R. （1995）. “The Dangers of Decentralization，”World Bank Research Observer10，pp.201-20.
Qian， Y. and G. Roland （1998）. “Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint，”American Economic Review 88，pp.1143-1162.
Qian， Y. and B. R. Weingast （1997）. “Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives，”Journal of Economic Perspectives 11，pp.83-92.
Raff， H. and J. D.Wilson （1997）. “Income Redistribution withWell-Informed Local Governments，”International Tax and Public Finance 4，pp.407-427.
Rattso， J. （2003）. “Fiscal Federation or Confederation in the European Union： The Challenge of the Common Pool Problem，” Working paper （March）.
Reifschneider， A. P. （forthcoming）.Competition in the Provision of Local Public Goods： Single Function Jurisdictions and Individual Choice. Aldershot， U.K.： Edward Elgar.
Rhode， P.W. and K. S. Strumpf （2003）. “Assessing the Importance of Tiebout Sorting： Local Heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990，”American Economic Review 93，pp.1648-1677.
Riker， W. H. （1964）.Federalism： Origin， Operation， Significance. Boston： Little， Brown， and Company.
Rodden， J. （2003）. “Reviving Leviathan： Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government，”International Organization 57，pp.695-729.
Rodden， J.， G. S. Eskeland and J. Litvack （eds.）. （2003）.Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints. Cambridge， MA： MIT Press.
Samuelson， P.A.（1954）. “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure，”Review of Economics and Statistics 36，pp.387-389.
Samuelson， P.A.（1955）. “Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure，”Review of Economics and Statistics 37，pp.350-356.
Schick， A. （1998）. “Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand’s Reforms，”World Bank Research Observer 13，pp.125-31.
Seabright， P. （1996）. “Accountability and Decentralization in Government： An Incomplete Contracts Model，”European Economic Review 40，pp.61-89.
Sinn， H.-W. （1994）. “How Much Europe? Subsidiarity， Centralization and Fiscal Competition，”Scottish Journal of Political Economy 41，pp.85-107.
Sinn， H.-W. （1997）. “The Selection Principle and Market Failure in Systems Competition，”Journal of Public Economics 66，pp.247-274.
Sobel， R. S. （1999）. “In Defense of the Articles of Confederation and the Contribution Mechanism as a Means of Government Finance： A General Comment on the Literature，”Public Choice 99，pp.347-356.
Sobel， R. S. （2002）. “Defending the Articles of Confederation： A Reply to Dougherty，”Public Choice 113，pp.287-299.
Tommasi， M. （2003）. “Centralization vs. Decentralization： A Principal-Agent Analysis，” unpublished paper.
Tresh， R. W. （2002）.Public Finance： A Normative Theory， 2nd edition. New York： Academic Press.
Weingast， B. R. （1995）. “The Economic Role of Political Institutions： Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development，”Journal of Law and Economic Organization11，pp.1-31.
Weingast， B. R. （forthcoming）. “The Performance and Stability of Federalism： An Institutional Perspective，” In Claude Menard and Mary Shirley （eds.），Handbook of the New Institutional Economics. Kluwer Academic Press.
Wellisch， D. （2000）.Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State. Cambridge： Cambridge University Press.
Wilson， J. D. （1996）. “Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards： Is There a Theoretical Basis for a Race to the Bottom? In J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec（eds.），Fair Trade and Harmonization： Prerequisites for Free Trade?， Vol. I. Cambridge， MA： MIT Press， pp. 393-427.
Wilson， J. D. （1999）. “Theories of Tax Competition，”National Tax Journal 52，pp.269-304.
Wildasin， D. E. （1997）. “Externalities and Bailouts： Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations，” unpublished paper.
Wildasin， D. E. （2004）. “The Institutions of Federalism： Toward an Analytical Framework，”National Tax Journal 57，pp.247-72
京公网安备 11010502034662号 