财新传媒

为何印度政府既失败又成功?

来源于 《比较》 2020年第3期 出版日期 2020年06月01日
文|德维什·卡普尔

4.一些结论性思考

  从1994年到2019年,印度人口增加了4.18亿。在这25年中,新增的人数超过了独立时的总人数(1951年人口普查为3.61亿),比美国总人口还多(只有美国1/3的面积)。然而,印度的弱政府却通过民主手段在20世纪90年代初设法实施了一系列经济改革,从那时起实施的经济政策为过去25年持续而强劲的经济增长奠定了基础。

  研究政府角色的文献常常渴望建立一个适度的政府:既不会弱到不能制定和实施满足广泛公共利益的政策,也不会强到能用其“掠夺之手”破坏私有产权、市场和合同。这就要求建立一个合格的官僚体系和外部制衡机制,包括对行政权力的宪法约束、权力分立、选举规则、独立的司法机构、自由媒体以及各种其他因素。

  但是,正如本文指出的,印度表面上具有许多这样的制度特征,然而政府表现还有许多不足之处。印度政府在一些间断性的活动中表现更好,其中的物品或服务是狭义的“俱乐部商品”,小型的技术官僚机构就足以应付。在租金和社会分裂重叠的领域,它做得不太好。在需要改变微观行为的事务上,它做得最差。我们认为,原因在于地方政府人员不足、早熟的民主、以非常规顺序确立的普选权以及体现在种姓和性别歧视上的“社会失败”。

  印度的经验突显了关于政府能力研究的缺陷;对“制度”方面的强调通常会忽略政府的“组织”方面,甚至文献大多集中在狭隘的公务员管理结构

  以及激励和监督上(有关概述请参见Finan、Olken and Pande,2017)。但是,关于公关部门人事管理实践如何影响政府表现的分析通常很少,例如内在动机的作用,薪酬结构(而不是薪酬水平),晋升渠道,买官,地方官僚机构的团队组成和物质条件,以及官僚机构在不同职能部门以及地方、邦和联邦政府等不同层级上的分布。

  关于印度政府及其能力的发展,最值得关注的趋势也许是微观和一线执行方面的改善。然而,在宏观政策制定的层面上,有关政府能力的问题越来越多。

  印度政府的一线执行能力正在显著提高,表现为迅速扩大项目规模以覆盖数千万甚至数亿人口的能力。在这10年中,印度已成功为超过3.5亿人开设了银行账户,为超过8000万家庭提供了燃气接入,建造了覆盖6亿人口的约1亿个厕所,并已开始实施覆盖数千万农民的直接现金转移项目。尽管这些项目都还存在数量、质量、及时性和排他性方面的挑战,但毫无疑问,印度正在提高将投入转化为产出的能力。当然,将这些产出转换为实际的表现又是另一回事。建造厕所与使用厕所不同,更不用说卫生和健康成果了。但这是一个开始。

  通过利用技术来实施大规模的项目,印度的一些“前端”弱点正在得到缓解。这方面的例子有,创建覆盖全部人口的统一身份认证系统(Aadhaar),以及开发统一支付接口作为数字支付平台。随着从乡村道路到电气化和数字接入等连通性的显著改善,用于改善公共项目提供以及促进市场更好运行的平台得到了加强。

  但是,尽管技术已大大降低了诸如申请护照、驾照和水电费支付等事务的交易成本,但技术自己并不能将水引入或引出房屋,或者在排放前对之进行处理。对于所有这些,印度需要一个更加有效率的政府,尤其需要资源更充足的地方政府,且其问责机制应该更多地是“向下”面向公民,而不是“向上”面向更高一级的官僚和政客。

  与微观层面的改善相反,印度政府的宏观政策能力令人担忧。自独立以来,观察人士赞赏印度植根于精英官僚体系的政府能力及其政策制定能力,同时悲叹其一线官员实施项目的严重无能。过去的印度政府尽管头重脚轻,但取得了较好的宏观表现,与微观层面平庸的执行情况形成了鲜明的对比。

  今天,这种模式似乎正在逆转。即使印度公共项目的执行情况有所改善,但经济增长仍然出现了停滞(如果没有下降的话,正如Lamba and Subramanian讨论的那样)。从最高法院到选举委员会,从印度储备银行到其统计机构,印度政府和民主核心机构的自主权似乎承受着越来越大的政治压力。印度政府是“弱政府”的说法正在失真,但是可以确保更有效地执行贫困项目的强政府也可能会限制公民自由,对民主制度的容忍度也会降低。有时,人们应当小心对待自己的诉求,因为它们有可能成真。

  (中国政法大学黄健栓译)

  参考文献

  Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson.2000. “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy,Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (4): 1167-99.

  Alesina, Alberto, and Dani Rodrik.1994. “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (2): 465-90.

  Ambedkar, B. R.1936. Annihilation of Caste. Lahore: printed by the author.

  Ang, Yuen Yuen.2012. “Counting Cadres: A Comparative View of the Size of Chinas Public Employment.” China Quarterly 211: 676-96.

  Balasubramaniam, Divya, Santanu Chatterjee, and David B. Mustard.2014. “Got Water? Social Divisions and Access to Public Goods in Rural India.” Economica 81 (321): 140-60.

  Banerjee, Abhijit, Lakshmi Iyer, and Rohini Somanathan.2005. “History, Social Divisions, and Public Goods in Rural India.” Journal of the European Economic Association 3 (2-3): 639-47.

  Bardhan, Pranab.1986. The Political Economy of Development in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

  Bardhan, Pranab.2016. “State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature.”Journal of Economic Literature 54 (3): 862-92.

  Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson.2011. Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters. Oxford: Princeton University Press.

  Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson.2013. “Taxation and Development.” In Handbook of Public Economics, edited by Alan Auerbach, Raj Chetty, Martin Feldstein, and Emmanuel Saez, 51-110.Amsterdam: North Holland.

  Bolt, Jutta, Robert Inklaar, Herman de Jong, and Jan Luiten van Zanden.2018. “Rebasing ‘Maddison’:New Income Comparisons and the Shape of LongRun Economic Development.” Maddison Project Working Paper 10.

  Brautigam, Deborah, OddHelge Fjeldstad, and Mick Moore, eds.2008. Taxation and StateBuilding in Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  Central Bureau of Health Intelligence (CBHI).2019.National Health Profile 2019.. New Delhi: Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.

  Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS).2015. “Trust in Institutions.” In Democracy in India:A Citizens’ Perspective, 53-74. Delhi: Lokniti.

  Centre for Tax Policy and Administration.2011. Tax Administration in OECD and Selected NonOECD Countries: Comparative Information Series (2010). Paris: OECD.

  Constituent Assembly Debates.1948. “Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings)—Volume VII.” New Delhi, India, November 4, 1948. https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/7/%C2%AD1948-11-04.

  Dahlstrm, Carl, Victor Lapuente, and Jan Teorell.2012. “The Merit of Meritocratization: Politics,Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption.” Political Research Quarterly 65(3):656-68.

  Das, Sabyasachi, and Gaurav Sabharwal.2017. “Whom Are You Doing a Favor to? Political Alignment and Allocation of Public Servants.” https://dassabyasachi.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/alignment_paper_april2017_v4.pdf (accessed April 3, 2019).

  Dasgupta, Aditya, and Devesh Kapur.2019. “The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India.” Unpublished.

  Dreze, Jean, and Amartya Sen.1989. Hunger and Public Action. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  Finan, Frederico, Benjamin A. Olken, and Rohini Pande.2017. “The Personnel Economics of the Developing State.” In Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, edited by Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee and Esther Duflo, 467-514. Amsterdam: North Holland.

  Fisman, Raymond, Florian Schulz, and Vikrant Vig.2014. “The Private Returns to Public Office.” Journal of Political Economy 122 (4): 806-62.

  Government of India (GOI).2015. Report of the Seventh Central Pay Commission. New Delhi: Governmentof India.

  Gupta, Aashish, Sangita Vyas, Payal Hathi, Nazar Khalid, Nikhil Srivastav, Dean Spears, and Diane Coffey. 2019. “Persistence of Solid Fuel Use Despite Increases in LPG Ownership: New Survey Evidence from Rural North India.”https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&ved=2ahUKEwi64obzqeXlAhUkwFkKHUVaBJAQFjAEegQIAxAC

  &url=https%3A%2F%2Friceinstitute.org%2Fwpcontent%2Fthemes%2Frice%2Fdownloadpdf.

  php%3Fpfile%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Friceinstitute.org%2Fwpcontent%2Fuploads%2F2019%2F03%2Fguptavyasetal2019persistenceofsolidfueluseinruralnorthindia.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1jI52d2bxur7aDjBtzIsln(accessed April 3, 2019).

  Hanna, Rema, and ShingYi Wang.2017. “Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9 (3): 262-90.

  Hirschman, Albert O.1967. Development Projects Observed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

  Hirschman, Albert O.1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

  India Census Commissioner.1951. Census of India. New Delhi: India Census Commissioner.

  Iyer, Lakshmi, and Anandi Mani.2012. “Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India.” Review of Economics and Statistics 94 (3): 723-39.

  Joshi, Vijay, and I. M. D. Little.1994. India: Macroeconomics and Political Economy, 1964-1991. Washington,DC: World Bank.

  Kapur, Devesh, and Madhav Khosla, eds.2019. Regulation in India: Design, Capacity, Performance. Oxford:Hart Publishing.

  Keefer, Philip, and Stuti Khemani.2004. “Why Do the Poor Receive Poor Services?” Economic and Political Weekly 39 (9): 935-43.

  Khosla, Madhav.Forthcoming. Indias Founding Moment: The Constitution of a Most Surprising Democracy.Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

  Lehne, Jonathan, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Oliver Vanden Eynde.2018. “Building Connections: Political Corruption and Road Construction in India.” Journal of Development Economics 131: 62-78.

  Mani, Anandi, and Sharun Mukand.2007. “Democracy, Visibility and Public Good Provision.” Journal of Development Economics 83 (2): 506-29.

  Mehta, Pratap Bhanu.2007. “Indias Unlikely Democracy: The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty.” Journal of Democracy 18 (2): 70-83.

  Ministry of Finance.2018. Economic Survey, 2017-18. New Delhi: Government of India.

  Ministry of Finance.2016. Economic Survey, 2015-16. New Delhi: Government of India.

  Ministry of Finance.2012. Economic Survey, 2011-12. New Delhi: Government of India.

  Ministry of Finance.2002. Economic Survey, 2001-02. New Delhi: Government of India.

  Ministry of Finance.1996. Economic Survey, 1995-96. New Delhi: Government of India.

  Ministry of Finance.1985. Economic Survey, 1984-85. New Delhi: Government of India.

  Ministry of Finance.1975. Economic Survey, 1974-75. New Delhi: Government of India.

  Ministry of Finance.1973. Economic Survey, 1972-73. New Delhi: Government of India.

  Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.2017. India Fact Sheet 2015-16. Mumbai: International Institute for Population Sciences.

  Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises.2018. Public Enterprises Survey 2016-17. New Delhi:Government of India.

  Muralidharan, Karthik, Jishnu Das, Alaka Holla, and Aakash Mohpal.2017. “The Fiscal Cost of Weak Governance: Evidence from Teacher Absence in India.” Journal of Public Economics 145: 116-35.

  National Sample Survey Office.2015. Key Indicators of Social Consumption in India: Education (NSS 71stRound). New Delhi: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.

  Niehaus, Paul, and Sandip Sukhtankar.2013. “Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect.”American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5 (4): 230-69.

  Page, Lucy, and Rohini Pande.2018. “Ending Global Poverty: Why Money Isnt Enough.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 32 (4): 173-200.

  Persson, Anna, and Bo Rothstein.2015. “Its My Money: Why Big Government May Be Good Government.” Comparative Politics 47 (2): 231-49.

  Polio Global Eradication Initiative.2016. Polio in India: Fact Sheet. Geneva: Polio Global Eradication Initiative.

  Princeton Review.n.d.“United States Military Academy.”https://www.princetonreview.com/college/unitedstatesmilitaryacademy1023919.

  Pritchett, Lant.2009. “A Review of Edward Luces ‘In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India.’” Journal of Economic Literature 47 (3): 771-80.

  Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi.2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and WellBeing in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  Purohit, Bhaskar, Tim Martineau, and Kabir Sheikh.2016. “Opening the Black Box of Transfer Systems in Public Sector Health Services in a Western State in India.” BMC Health Services Research 16 (1):419.

  Quraishi, S. Y.2019. “What It Takes to Run an Election for India.” New York Times, April 25. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/opinion/indiaelections.html.

  Radkar, Anjali.2012. “Risk of Maternal Mortality: Indian Scenario.” In Global Health: A Challenge for Interdisciplinary Research, edited by Martin Kappas, Uwe Gro, and Dermot Kelleher, 117-32. Gttingen:Universittsverlag Gttingen.

  Ramachandran, Vimala, Tara Béteille, Toby Linden, Sangeeta Dey, Sangeeta Goyal, and Prerna Goel Chatterjee.2018. Getting the Right Teachers into the Right Schools: Managing Indias Teacher Workforce.Washington, DC: World Bank.

  Rauch, James E., and Peter B. Evans.2000. “Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries.” Journal of Public Economics 75 (1): 49-71.

  Ren, Xuefei.2015. “City Power and Urban Fiscal Crises: The USA, China, and India.” International Journal of Urban Sciences 19 (1): 73-81.

  Reserve Bank of India.2018. “Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled Commercial Banks in India.”https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/AnnualPublications.aspx?head=Basic+Statistical+Returns.

  Rodrik, Dani, and Arvind Subramanian.2003. “The Primacy of Institutions (and What This Does and Does Not Mean).” Finance and Development 40 (2): 31-34.

  Roy, Tirthankar.1996. “The Role of the State in Initiating Development: A Study of Interwar South and Southeast Asia.” Indian Economic and Social History Review 33 (4): 373-401.

  Roy, Tirthankar.2011. The Economic History of India, 1857-1947. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  SchiavoCampo, Salvatore, Giulio de Tommaso, and Amitabha Mukherjee.1997. “Government Employment and Pay: A Global and Regional Perspective.” Policy Research Working Paper 1771.

  Sheahan, Megan, Yanyan Liu, Christopher B. Barrett, and Sudha Narayanan.2018. “Preferential Resource Spending under an Employment Guarantee: The Political Economy of MGNREGS in Andhra Pradesh.” World Bank Economic Review 32 (3): 551-69.

  Sukhtankar, Sandip, and Milan Vaishnav.2015. “Corruption in India: Bridging Research Evidence and Policy Options.” India Policy Forum 11: 193-276.

  Union Public Service Commission UPSC.2014-2016. “Annual Reports.” https://www.upsc.gov.in/annualreports.

  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).2019. Global Study on Homicide 2019. Vienna:UNODC.

  US Office of Personnel Management.1940-2014. “Historical Federal Workforce Tables: Executive Branch Civilian Employment since 1940.” https://www.opm.gov/policydataoversight/dataanalysisdocumentation/federalemploymentreports/historicaltables/executivebranchcivilianemploymentsince1940/.

  US Postal Service.2014. 2014 Annual Report to Congress. Washington, DC: USPS.

  Wade, Robert.1982. “The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India.” Journal of Development Studies 18 (3): 287-328.

  [《比较》印刷版,点此订阅,随时起刊,免费快递。]

版面编辑:王影
财新网主编精选版电邮 样例
财新网新闻版电邮全新升级!财新网主编精心编写,每个工作日定时投递,篇篇重磅,可信可引。
订阅