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强大证券市场的法律和制度前提

来源于 《比较》 2020年第4期 出版日期 2020年08月01日
文|伯纳德·布莱克

结论:下一步行动

  支持强大证券市场的复杂制度无法快速建立。正如路易斯·洛温斯坦在解释美国会计惯例时说的那样:“我们的披露制度的各个方面——会计准则、法律行业、行政监督、大量的分析师、新闻界——都是在长期过程中一砖一瓦地建立起来的。” (*97.Lowenstein (1996),同脚注,第1361—1362页。)

  一些制度可以先于市场发展。其他制度只会随着证券市场的发展而发展。许多转轨经济体几乎没有或根本没有上述核心制度。它们应该从哪里开始呢?

  一个重点关注的领域应该是土生土长并且可以先于市场发展的制度。这一工作可以从诚实的法院、监管者和检察官开始,无论一个国家的资本市场采取何种形式,这些都是至关重要的。政府的诚实不只是对资本市场发展至关重要。

  第二个好的起点是良好的资本市场规则。保护投资者的规则只是支持证券市场的制度框架的一部分,但它们可能使该框架中的其他要素更快地发展。此外,这些规则很大程度上可以从外部引进。但是,引进国需要明白,如果它聘请五组外国顾问,那么他们将推荐五种不同的法律,相互之间不一致且与该国现有的法律相抵触。本地起草者需要密切参与起草过程,以确保规则适合现有的法律框架,并尽量以现有的术语和惯例来构建。即使顺利,这一过程也将持续多年。许多国家急于完成这项工作,反而欲速则不达。(*98.关于对从外部引入的规则的本地改造和理解,参见DANIEL BERKOWITZ, KATHARINA PISTOR & JEAN\|FRANCOIS RICHARD, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, LEGALITY, AND THE TRANSPLANT EFFECT (working paper, 1999),可从以下网址获得:http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=183269 (Social Science Research Network)。关于我自己将本文讨论的原则改造到具体背景的工作,参见Black(2001),同脚注, 以及Black, Metzger, O’Brien & Shin (2001), 同脚注。)

  会计准则是信息披露的核心。国际会计准则委员会即将制定一套可行的国际会计准则,而各国可以在制定自己的准则时借鉴该准则,甚至全盘接收。

  如果声誉卓著的中介机构势单力薄或数量特别少,那么另一个重要的长期步骤就是建立或加强商学院(培养投资银行家和会计师)和法学院(培养证券律师和监管者)。投资于培训年轻人需要数十年的时间才能有所收获。但是,如果不投资,那么几十年以后,该国仍然不具备所需的前提条件。在这里,大量借用是可行的方法,一国可以设立一个项目(也许有外国援助资金),将顶尖的学生送到外国专业学校。

  在发达国家,学者经常认为良好的公司治理围绕着董事的独立性、审计委员会的存在和作用、对公司控制权市场的约束等展开。在发展中国家,公司治理的内容通常是非常初级的。这些国家在担心上市公司董事会是否拥有占多数的独立董事之前,需要诚实的法官和监管者、良好的披露规则以及创建诚实文化。

  (中国政法大学黄健栓译)

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