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数字时代的竞争与产业挑战

2024年06月01日第3期
news 原图 垄断总会引起人们对价格高昂而创新不足的担忧。图:视觉中国
文|让·梯若尔

6.总结

  科技巨头的支配地位并没有让我们在自由放任和民粹主义干预之间做出难以接受的选择。尽管本文的目的是梳理我们对这一问题的认识,并研究现有的权衡取舍,但本文还是能够得出一些结论。首先,在现有法律的范围内,公共政策可以得到很大的改进。事实上,我们的立法机构已经预见当前的许多问题。然而,政策的实施滞后于技术、商业和社会的发展。我认为,在企业全球化、技术快速进步和出现数字看门人的时代,老旧的监管措施是不切实际的;对于适当的监管,又存在信息不足。我也对拆分提出了一些保留意见,更多的是基于实践而非理论;快速发展的技术、在位企业将事情搞得千头万绪的习惯,以及(再次)科技公司的全球性质,使得竞争管理机构和监管机构很难确定稳定的必需设施,并将它从公司的其他部分中分拆然后进行监管。可以肯定的是,如果政策制定要走这条路,就必须制订清晰连贯的计划。就目前而言,从一开始就厘清头绪,听起来似乎是更简单的政策。然而,这要求科技巨头必须通报它们的收购行为,并且对于初创企业的收购行为,如果有理由怀疑被收购公司有一天会成为竞争对手,那么应该将举证责任转移到科技公司身上。

  关于可竞争性的必要性,我强调了多平台的竞争优势,以及垄断平台对排他性合同的监督。我还回顾了可以帮助确保这些市场具有一定竞争性的其他策略。

  尽管没有灵丹妙药,但竞争监管机构应该对支配型平台的自我优待保持警惕。那些既是市场平台和技术平台又提供市场和应用程序的企业,不能平等地对待较自己逊色的竞争对手。然而,优待自家产品而损害同等或更优产品的做法有可能是反竞争的,经济学家应该在这方面投入更多的精力来设计指导方针,以利于监管当局处理这些行为。更宽泛的公平问题还需要制定一般性的规则来确定合理的接入费用。

  关于数据所有权,我讨论了当前以数据换服务这种安排的替代方案,包括有限的数据收集、小额补偿、数据许可和数据信托、以消费者为中心的数据,并分析了将数据作为进入壁垒的做法的影响。我的观点是,就像类似《通用数据保护条例》的隐私监管法规一样,学术思考滞后于技术和商业的发展。产业政策和国家补贴也是如此,近年来,产业政策和国家补贴在欧洲、中国、美国和世界其他几个地区的受欢迎程度有所提高。经济学家在这些问题上确实有一些有用的理论和实证知识,但总的来说,他们在这个领域的研究仍然不足。

  制度变革对于提高竞争政策的灵活性和有效性至关重要。在预测变化和事后反应之间的平衡中我们应该更倾向于前者。这需要收集有关支配型企业及其市场的信息,设计良好的行为准则(并更多地利用商业审查函,前提是反垄断机构可以自行选择),并赋予反垄断机构采取临时措施的能力。此外,正如之前讨论的那样,反垄断机构必须修改合并审查的程序。

  最后,经济学家必须发展出能够影响并指导反垄断从业者的知识。反垄断领域往往不是泾渭分明的。我们讨论了企业战略,比如共同所有权和最优价格保证,它们的存在既有可以被完全接受的理由,也有可能导致强烈的反竞争结果。禁止行为等结构性方法可能会存在因噎废食的风险。因此,我们必须努力设计不需要太多监管信息的规则,并使更多的选择性干预成为可能。■

  (对外经济贸易大学中国金融学院万宜嘉 译)

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